WTO can be viewed as public good in that it provides a forum for negotiations which also produces the necessary legal framework to act as support for liberalization agreed. To avoid any misunderstandings, in this paper the discussion focuses on WTO as a forum and a set of agreements, not on free trade. Since the legal agreements coming under its aegis are for good reasons incomplete, the WTO provides an additional public good by 'completing' the original contract through case law. The importance of this latter feature increases over time as tariffs are driven towards irrelevance. In turn, the WTO has no particular attitude towards public goods provided by its Members.
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Introduction
There are two dimensions in the discussion regarding WTO and public goods, depending on the perspective adopted: on the one hand, whether WTO can be viewed as public good, and if so which aspects of WTO? And, on the other, how does the WTO view public goods?
To respond to the first question, I assume the commonplace definition for public good (non-rival and non-excludable) and build on a distinction between the design and the actual use of the WTO first discussed in Staiger (2004) . In short, the idea is that the WTO is a public good in the sense that it provides a forum that is necessary to address (negative) external effects stemming from unilateral definition of trade policies. Similar effects stem, in the classic formulation of the terms of trade theory, from unilateral tariffsetting: trading nations have little if any incentive to control for the effects of their tariffs on their partners; they will typically set them taking into account their own producerand consumer welfare. To the extent that they have bargaining power, they can affect terms of trade when doing so. Absent an international agreement that will help 'internalize' similar effects, one could end up in a spiral of unilateral tariff-setting that will be met by retaliatory responses. 1 The GATT (and now the WTO) is the instrument that helps address this issue. 2 In its original form, the regulatory arsenal committed was meant to provide insurance policy against those incentivized to circumvent their tariff promise: 3 this could happen since tariffs could be decomposed into taxes for consumers cum subsidies to producers 1 Johnson (1953-54) . 2 The rationale for the GATT is not solely dependent on a prior espousing of the terms of tradeexplanation: indeed, the GATT has been also explained by some as an instrument to avoid future inconsistent behaviour ('commitment' theory), see Tumlir (1985) , and more recently Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) . The persuasiveness of this theory to explain the original GATT is doubtful in light of the very limited commitment regarding domestic instruments. Irrespective of the rationale for it, it is aspect of the GATT to serve as forum for international trade negotiations that makes it a public good.
(equivalence propositions), and thus, absent a commitment on domestic instruments as well (such as domestic taxes and subsidies) the tariff promise could become meaningless. 4 Baldwin (1970) with his wonderfully simple yet highly accurate tide-metaphor, explained why it was only sensible for negotiators to focus initially on tariffs: high tariffs obscured the 'bite' of non-tariff barriers (domestic instruments). Terms of trade can, moreover, be affected through domestic instruments as well and not only through tariffs. Indeed, what is the difference between a 100% import tariff and a 100% consumption tax? 5 And indeed, the gradual reduction of tariffs brought them to daylight and negotiators were asked to address them in order to preserve the value of their prior efforts: this is in essence the 'bicycle' and/or 'tricycle' theory that Bhagwati developed in his writings (1988) , (2008) that we discuss in more detail infra. This is why to discuss the WTO as public good one needs to also focus on the legal arsenal that has been added to the original GATT.
One caveat is necessary here at the outset: the WTO is not free for all, in fact nonMembers are excluded from using this forum. 6 And to become a Member one needs to pay a price, a 'ticket to entry' which, as the years go by, becomes more and more expensive. A look into China's Protocol of Accession as well as all protocols of accession post-1995 and a comparison with accessions before the Uruguay round amply proves 4 For a formal explanation, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002) . Limão et al. (2008) have provided empirical proof to the theoretical terms-of-trade argument. this point. 7 It follows that to start thinking of the WTO as public good one needs to make a generous concession and think of it not as a good free for all but only for its Members.
Second, usually when referring to public goods one has in mind private citizens enjoying say clean air or a park for free. Here the units of account are states and not citizens and, as argued above, not all states. 8 With regard to the second question addressed in this paper, namely how does the WTO address public goods, our discussion will be briefer: the rationale for brevity is that the WTO has not developed a comprehensive approach towards public goods, although indirectly its actions might not be inconsequential.
With this in mind, in Section 2 we discuss WTO as public good; Section 3 focuses on the WTO (non) approach towards public goods, whereas Section 4 concludes.
WTO, a Public Good
In this Section, I build on Staiger (2004) who distinguished between the creation/establishment of the GATT/WTO on the one hand, and its use on the other. In his view, whereas the former has public good features, the latter is prone to use for private ends. I find this distinction sensible. In what follows, I will insist a bit more on the GATT/WTO regime of today, that is, the trade institution as a law-making entity, a point already noted by Staiger albeit en passant. Kindleberger (1986) observes that public goods are typically under-produced not for the Galbraithian reason that private goods are advertised and public goods are notbut because the consumer who has access to the good anyhow has little reason to vote the taxes, or pay his or her appropriate share. Unless the consumer is a highly moral person, following the Kantian Catgeorical Imperative of acting in ways which can be generalized, he or she is apt to be a 'free rider'.
How much of this is true as far as the WTO is concerned?
A Forum for Tariff Negotiations
The list of public goods provided by Adam Smith (1759) was limited to national defence, law and order and public works. Ever since, most people would agree that weights and measures, language, money would qualify as such. In the international sphere, public goods are produced to serve common purposes. Political science has produced two schools: the realists, who argue that public goods are produced by a leading power, the 'hegemon', and the moralists (or institutionalists), who argue that hegemons set in motion regimes of international cooperation. Krasner (1983) , and Keohane (1984) discuss these schools (especially the latter) in more detail. Of interest to us is that the free trade regime is the outcome of British and the subsequent US hegemony that put in place the regime for cooperation, the original GATT. 9 Governments have a shared interest in the creation and maintenance of the WTO: absent this forum, negotiations on mutually advantageous tariff concessions would not have taken place and one would risk spiralling into retaliatory tariffs. At the same time, it is 9 Irwin et al. (2008). hard to imagine why one trading nation would have the incentive to provide this goodthere is an undeniable collective action issue here. 10 Bargaining involves bargaining externalities as well: this point is intimately linked with the discussion under 2.3 infra, since trading nations will use the WTO to pursue private goods. Home will discuss tariff exchanges with Foreign on items of export interest to Home and not to a third country. In extreme form, bargaining externalities could put into question the very existence of the edifice: it is disturbing to say the least that every time a negotiating round hits deadlock, voices are raised to the effect that the WTO edifice as such is in grave danger. Are such fears unfounded?
The response to this question is multi-faceted and much of the response depends on difficult to quantify factors, such as willingness to invest political capital to the successful conclusion of rounds etc. At a more narrow level, Bhagwati (1988) first explained why, assuming the bicycle goes the right way, the value of concessions made depends also on the continuation of the liberalization process. 11 Bhagwati (2008) expanded on that and produced what he termed the 'tricycle' theory: 12 developing countries will sometimes sign preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with other countries at the same development level, hoping to learn from such PTAs without fearing massive disruptions from unequal competition; they will then and only then move to non-discriminatory (MFN, most favoured nation) competition. The point is that the continuous existence and relevance of the WTO holds the key in securing that past concessions will continue to be valuable to participants.
10 In Mankiw's inimitable expression, 'markets work well when the good is ice cream, but they work badly when the good is clean air ', Mankiw (2008) at p. 226.
11 For a formal proof, see Staiger (1990) . 12 Inspired by the fact that, timid children will go on to the two wheel-bicycle after having first experienced a three wheel-in order to reassure and acclimatise themselves to having their feet off the ground.
The GATT/WTO, by any reasonable benchmark, has been quite successful in dismantling tariff protection over the years. 13 It has also managed to add an impressive regulatory framework aimed at supporting the liberalization efforts, a point to which we will come back in the next sub-section. Of course the problems surrounding the on-going Doha round have cast some doubt on this rosy picture. There are mitigating factors explaining the current difficulties in concluding the Doha round and they should be taken into account: there are more players, more agreements to be negotiated, a theme (trade and development) that proves more difficult to tackle and more divisive than originally anticipated, the upcoming US elections, etc. At any rate, on present evidence, it will be quite an exaggeration to argue that the bicycle theory does not obtain anymore in the multilateral trade talks. substantial. This paper thus suggests that the rationale for going preferential should also be sought in WTOx-type of obligations. There is thus, a discrepancy between the multilateral-and the preferential agenda and it could be that the reason for going preferential has to do with the content of the agenda: it seems plausible (although unproven as yet) to argue that PTAs are running away with the trade agenda of the 21st century, while the WTO still operates in last century's terms. If true, then this would be the first serious scare for the multilateral system. As things stand, nevertheless, it is too early to pronounce on this score.
The WTO Law and its Completion
13 Irwin (1998a) and (1998b) provides the most comprehensive quantification of tariffs since the inception of the GATT and leading up to the post-Uruguay round era.
The point in the preceding sub-section has been that the WTO seen as a forum for negotiating trade liberalization is a public good, the preservation of which is function of its policy-relevance: to the extent that the WTO becomes policy-irrelevant either because of dis-interest to multilaterally liberalize trade from now on, or for any other reason, then the point made falls. 14 The WTO relevance is being challenged but not threatened so far at least. The best supporting argument for this thesis is that trade rounds (like the Doha round) are integral part of but do not exhaust the bicycle in the bicycle theory discussed above. The WTO has life in between rounds: it administers the existing agreements, and it completes them. Let us take each point in turn.
The WTO has in place dozens of committees which take care of everyday business: they run the notifications procedures aimed at reducing transaction costs, decide on 'agreed interpretations' (like the definition of period of investigation in the antidumping context), 15 and even manage to settle an impressive number of disputes so that the administrative burden for WTO adjudicating bodies is reduced. 16 In a way, this function of the WTO is a public good in itself, in that the WTO 'completes' thus the originally 'incomplete' contract.
The point is that the WTO can generate public goods by clarifying for all its Members the ambit and content of its various rules. It is best illustrated by the function of WTO adjudicating bodies and is intimately connected to the inclusion of domestic instruments
14
Note that the recent US initiative to liberalize trade in services among some like-minded nations only and not across the total WTO Membership is supposed to take place within the WTO in the form of plurilateral agreement. Similar initiatives are thus, not undermining the policy relevance of the WTO. in the WTO-edifice. Recall Baldwin's intuition that the shift towards disciplining domestic instruments rationally followed the disciplining of border instruments. Timewise, the shift starts in the '60s with the Kennedy round, albeit in timid way at first. It is the successful conclusion of the Tokyo-first and even more so the Uruguay round that mark the definitive shift towards the multilateral disciplining of domestic instruments.
Yet, the inclusion of domestic instruments presented negotiators with more than they could have handled: first, there is an extremely large number of different domestic policy instruments with trade impact; second, domestic policies are responsive to changes in the underlying economic/political environment, and as a result keep changing themselves. One possibility would be that the agreement specified for each Member the policies to be pursued in each and every situation that the Member might find itself in, that is, that the agreement is "state-contingent" in economic jargon. But of course, with the agreement intended to be in place for an extended period of time, there would be a huge number of such different economic/political situations that would call for different policy responses. As a result, WTO Members would have to be in constant negotiations which probably also means absence of an international trade agreement: the costs of negotiating and drawing up such a grand contract would be huge, and would most likely dominate the gains it would bring. Indeed, it would amount to central planning at a global scale. This is one reason why trade agreements are "incomplete", in the sense that they do not contain all information necessary for their operation at the moment of their inception. 17 Besides, contracting social policies might be deemed politically undesirable in some quarters.
Contractual incompleteness can of course, take many forms: 18 undertakings may not be conditioned on changes in the environment, they can be "rigid"; undertakings can also leave "discretion" to individual governments to determine their policies unilaterally. The problem of course, is that in this scenario, when discretion is permitted, there are good 17 Grossman et al. (2012) . 18 Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010). reasons to believe that governments have incentives to use such discretion for protectionist purposes, as a substitute for the border instruments that have been bound. This is essentially where the political economy literature kicks in. Contractual incompleteness by itself is not necessarily a problem; governance problems are posed when incomplete contracts are combined with opportunism (Williamson, 2005) . The GATT does not eliminate the potential for such behaviour: WTO Members will usually have private information when regulating which they only in part have to reveal (by virtue of the transparency obligation) 19 and a strong incentive to cheat (by pretending, for example, to be internalizing environmental externalities when acting solely, or predominantly in the interest of their domestic producer, and thus imposing costs on their trading partners through beggar thy neighbour policies). 20 Economic theory and the negotiating record see eye to eye on this score: the Chairman of the Technical Sub-committee in charge of preparing the draft provision on NT during the London Conference (1946) noted to this effect: 21 Whatever we do here, we shall never be able to cover every contingency and possibility in a draft. Economic life is too varied for that, and there are all kinds of questions which are bound to arise later on. The important thing is that once we have this agreement laid down we have to act in the spirit of it. There is no doubt there will be certain difficulties, but if we are able to cover 75 or 80 or 85 per cent of them I think it will be sufficient.
They thus knowingly left the provision "incomplete", to be gradually "completed" through subsequent adjudication (and, eventually, re-negotiation). Some re-negotiation 19 See the discussion on transparency in Chapter 10. 20 Maskin and Tirole (1999) have persuasively argued that the manner in which we think about incomplete contracts is not optimal. They point out that instead of discussing contingencies, contractual parties could be discussing payoffs. There are doubts, however, as to whether their model can fit the GATT. With respect to some of the policies (potentially) covered by NT, it is at least doubtful that governments would be willing to negotiate specific disciplines and (eventually) payoffs. In the absence of a (re-)negotiated solution, it will be left to the WTO judge to decide whether particular interventions contravene or not the spirit of the "incomplete" contract. The GATT/WTO judge has indeed been called to do that through case law. 22 It is important to note at the outset of this discussion that the WTO is equipped with a highly unusual (for international relations) dispute settlement system: the compulsory nature of third party adjudication in the WTO means that a vast number of disputes have been submitted to it so far. 23 Pushing the decision to the adjudicating bodies is not riskfree, since, depending inter alia on the information in the original contract (or lack of it) the judge might be committing errors (both false positives and/or negatives). The allocation of the burden of proof as well as the quantum of proof required will hold the key in developing a clear judicial strategy towards distinguish wheat from chaff so to speak.
The WTO judge does not start from a clean slate and its hands are not free. The judge is an agent bound by the agency contract signed with the principals, the WTO Members.
The contract reads:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
It follows that the WTO judge cannot undo the balance of rights and obligations as struck by the WTO Members: it must respect the policy space entrusted to the WTO by all trading nations and cannot transfer sovereignty to the international plane that principals did not agree themselves to transfer. 24 Its job of course would have been easier if the contract had been clearer, that is, more 'complete'. Alas, it is not. Its discretion to clarify it is not open-ended either: the WTO judge, from the first case it called to address (US-Gasoline), has understood the reference to 'customary rules of interpretation of public international law' included in Art. 3.2 DSU as tantamount to a reference to the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The VCLT contains many interpretative elements but does not decide how much weight should be given on each one of them. 25 Consequently, the WTO judge is in a non-enviable position: it is called to interpret one incomplete contract (the GATT) through another (the VCLT).
From a pure methodological perspective, contract-incompleteness requests from the judge to: (a) decide on the coverage of this provision; (b) decide on the understanding of its key terms. 24 There is no stare decisis in WTO. Still, the legitimacy of WTO courts depends largely on the manner in which they treat their own case law. They are expected to apply the same law to the same transactions irrespective of the identity of the parties involved in particular dispute. There is definitely something in the colloquial saying 'justice must be blind'. In doing that, judges and courts will be preparing their own demise: they will make law so predictable that in good faith there will be little to argue about. Of course, new laws, and new knowledge regarding the manner in which specific issues should be treated casts some doubt on this statement. The basic mould though should hold.
Through case law thus, WTO adjudicating bodies will be providing a public good by clarifying the existing agreements which, for the reasons mentioned are 'incomplete '. 26 Some might put into question that the law-making exercise (and its completion through adjudication) is indeed a public good, and often for good reasons. Indeed, what kind of public good is it to introduce an Agreement on Antidumping which legalizes decisions taken without considering economy wide welfare effects? In my view, similar arguments are misplaced for the counterfactual to the existing Agreement (which is nowhere near my ideal scheme to deal with international price discrimination) is 'the law of the jungle': at least now, an investigating authority will have to account for a series of procedural requirements when imposing duties that on occasion constrain its discretion and might even lead to non-imposition. Absent this disciplining, uncertainty regarding the conduct of domestic institutions in charge of trade policy would reign. It is true that there is little theoretical and empirical work analysing the value of WTO institutions (especially its legal institutions) in reducing uncertainty for prospective exporters. A notable exception is Handley (2011) : in a dynamic model involving heterogeneous firms, he shows that uncertainty would delay entry of exporters into new markets and would also make them less responsive to applied tariff reductions. He tests empirically all this by investigating Australian imports in 2004 and 2006 to underscore his point that the WTO legal regime has a beneficial effect on trade by reducing uncertainty regarding the exercise of trade policies at the national level: the more the contract is 'completed' through case law, the less uncertainty survives of course.
Making Use of the WTO for Private Ends
Proponents of the hegemonic theory will go so far as to argue that Home's tariff reductions are a public good, since many can profit from it. This view should not be accepted: first, there is rivalry in consumption here since demand for goods is not typically infinitely elastic. Exports by source A to Home's market will diminish exports by B of the same good to the same destination, even if B is not excluded from making use of the concession. In presence of rivalry in consumption, one cannot speak of public goods at least in its commonplace definition (no rivalry in consumption, and no excludability). Second, Home will be asking from Foreign to make tariff concessions in a matter of interest to it and not necessarily to the rest of the world.
Correctly Staiger (2004) held that the WTO is a public good used by trading nations to pursue private ends. Pursuing private ends might lead to prisoners' dilemma-type of situations, and this is where our discussion supra regarding bargaining externalities becomes relevant. The evaluation of the WTO insurance policy against this risk is hard for a number of reasons. Exit from the WTO is of course possible, but no one has exited so far: does this suffice for a conclusion that the WTO is strong as ever? No since, 'cheap' temporary exit is possible through violations of the agreed; the WTO is after all, a self enforcing contract where bargaining asymmetries matter, so who would dare to retaliate against the EU or the US (other than the two of them)? And yet, we do not observe trade wars frequently and when they do occur they concern a small, insignificant part of international trade. Bown's (2011) edited volume strongly supports the conclusion that the WTO has survived not only bargaining externalities but selfcentred unilateral behaviour as well: post-crisis the evidence is that few trading nations had had recourse to few, very few indeed by any reasonable benchmark, trade protection measures. Theory has yet to come up with an explanation as the many contributions in Bown's volume suggest. Optimists support that the financial-did not lead to a trade crisis because of the WTO. Indeed, the parallels with the 1929 have been discussed in literature as have been the divergent responses of the international community then and now. 27 The bicycle seems to be going the right direction in this respect at least.
WTO and Public Goods
The WTO has not adopted a particular stance towards public goods. True, the preamble does contain explicit language acknowledging that trade liberalization under the auspices of the WTO should go hand in hand with the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment… Similar language would suggest that the bridge to supplying or aiding the realization of public goods would be provided somewhere in the Agreement. It is not. The WTO does not address public goods in meaningful manner, that is, beyond the hortatory language cited above which does not reflect legally binding obligations for its Members.
With the exception of TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights), the WTO is a negative integration contract, where domestic policies will be defined unilaterally and, to the extent they exhibit international spill-overs, the latter will have to be internalized essentially through non-discrimination. The question whether a domestic policy yields a public good or not is simply immaterial to WTO law that only cares about ensuring WTO-consistency across the policies pursued.
The absence of common policies entails the absence of any discussion regarding a WTOview towards similar policies, assuming some of them could qualify as public goods.
27 Irwin (2011) .
The Appellate Body in its EC-Asbestos jurisprudence did state that it would adopt a more deferential standard of review whenever public health is at stake, and this is the only similar pronouncement. It did not link its standard to the provision of a public good though. 28 In US-Gasoline, the Appellate Body was dealing with a challenge against a US measure ostensibly aiming to protect public good (clean air) and applied its usual standard of review under Art. XX GATT without controlling for the fact that the protection of a public good was at stake.
One might think that the regulation of electronic commerce would point to a different solution here: after all, electronic commerce is a vehicle of ideas, free speech etc. Yet, electronic commerce is treated by the WTO as a mode of supply of services which must, like any other mode of supply, respect the various disciplines included in GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) like national treatment, MFN etc. There is no positive integration with respect to electronic commerce: the so called 'consensus statement' adopted by WTO Members to this effect is nothing more than an acceptance of the applicability of these principles (which do not question the negative integration character of the GATS) in the sphere of electronic commerce. 29 One would have a hard time to equate intellectual property rights with public goods since they are characterized by monopoly rents and hence by an elements of excludability.
Conclusions
The analysis above points to the following conclusions: (d) On the other hand, the WTO has nothing particular to say regarding its stance towards public goods in terms of say a more deferential standard of review towards them. The WTO disciplines on subsidies certainly 'help' WTO Members provide public goods themselves; as a matter of WTO law though, there is no incentives to do so, WTO Members remaining free to act as they deem best. This is the unavoidable result of the quintessential character of the WTO contract which, with the exception of the agreement on trade related intellectual property rights, is a negative integration-contract.
